Is it possible that Aristotle believed that good and bad fortune are part of life and that they provide, define, or act as contrast to what life is in essence but that a virtuous person would select to be happy regardless of current fortune?
He says in the quote above that a human life needs "fortunes" (good fortune) added. I don't think it's possible to interpret that in any other way than good fortune is necessary for happiness. Part for the definition Aristotle gives of happiness in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics is that it is complete (autarkes). Nothing further can be added to happiness. If anything needs to be added to make life complete we have not yet reached happiness. It seems to me that Aristotle is trying to say that good fortune is preferable but not necessary for happiness - and that it is preferable because it enables us to do good to a greater number of people. In other words he seems so close to agree with the Stoics that it is hard to avoid the impression that he would indeed have agreed with them if he had known (or himself thought of) the distinction between true goods and preferable indifferents. Notice that "fortunes" are not good in themselves in the quote above - only as means to act virtously on a grander scale. In other words they are not true goods.
Nicomachean Ethics 1099a31-1099b6 is relevant as well for the understanding of what Aristotle means by "external goods" and "blessedness". He says about happiness:
"All the same, it apparently needs external goods to be added, as we said, since it is impossible or not easy to do noble actions without supplies. For just as we perform many actions by means of instruments, we perform many by means of friends, wealth, and political power. Then again there are some whose deprivation disfigures blessedness, such as good breeding, good children, and noble looks. For we scarcely have the stamp of happiness if we are extremely ugly in appearance, ill-bred, living a solitary life, or childless, and have it even less, presumably, if our children or friends are totally bad or were good but have died. Just as we said, then, happiness does seem to need this sort of prosperity to be added".
Again, it is clear that the external goods are not good in themselves but as means for virtous action. Regarding blessedness it is interestingly described as "the stamp of happiness". Again the idea seems to be that a person with reasonably good looks, good reputation, a reasonable amount of wealth and with friends, family and influence - and who take full advantage of his good fortune to do as much good as possible - are more fully a realization of what a human being naturally is than a virtous but isolated, poor, disfigured and dishonored person is. Not more happy - simply more fully a realization of what a human being naturally is. The Stoics would surely agree. They also see the things such as health, wealth, friends, family, influence as things a wise human being would naturally prefer to have.
"There is a great difference between joy and pain. If I am asked to choose, I will pursue one and avoid the other; for the one is in accordance with nature, the other contrary to it."
"Being wounded, or being roasted over a slow fire, or being afflicted with ill health is contrary to nature, but preserving an unflagging spirit amid such trials is in accordance with nature."
Bottom line: In my opinion, Aristotle has been wildly misunderstood regarding this topic. First of all "external goods" such as some amount of health, wealth, goods looks, good reputation, and friends and family are only goods in so far as they are used wisely and in the service of virtue. In other words, they are only instrumental goods. Secondly they are only necessary for blessedness - not for happiness. A virtous person will be entirely happy without them but not "blessed" - not a fully realized human being but an essentially realized human being.
In other words, what a Stoic can learn from Aristotle is that while external goods are neither good nor bad in themselves, they are not irrelevant for an understanding of what a fully realized human being is.
Is it possible that Aristotle believed that good and bad fortune are part of life and that they provide, define, or act as contrast to what life is in essence but that a virtuous person would select to be happy regardless of current fortune?
ReplyDeleteHe says in the quote above that a human life needs "fortunes" (good fortune) added. I don't think it's possible to interpret that in any other way than good fortune is necessary for happiness. Part for the definition Aristotle gives of happiness in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics is that it is complete (autarkes). Nothing further can be added to happiness. If anything needs to be added to make life complete we have not yet reached happiness. It seems to me that Aristotle is trying to say that good fortune is preferable but not necessary for happiness - and that it is preferable because it enables us to do good to a greater number of people. In other words he seems so close to agree with the Stoics that it is hard to avoid the impression that he would indeed have agreed with them if he had known (or himself thought of) the distinction between true goods and preferable indifferents. Notice that "fortunes" are not good in themselves in the quote above - only as means to act virtously on a grander scale. In other words they are not true goods.
DeleteNicomachean Ethics 1099a31-1099b6 is relevant as well for the understanding of what Aristotle means by "external goods" and "blessedness". He says about happiness:
ReplyDelete"All the same, it apparently needs external goods to be added, as we said, since it is impossible or not easy to do noble actions without supplies. For just as we perform many actions by means of instruments, we perform many by means of friends, wealth, and political power. Then again there are some whose deprivation disfigures blessedness, such as good breeding, good children, and noble looks. For we scarcely have the stamp of happiness if we are extremely ugly in appearance, ill-bred, living a solitary life, or childless, and have it even less, presumably, if our children or friends are totally bad or were good but have died.
Just as we said, then, happiness does seem to need this sort of prosperity to be added".
Again, it is clear that the external goods are not good in themselves but as means for virtous action. Regarding blessedness it is interestingly described as "the stamp of happiness". Again the idea seems to be that a person with reasonably good looks, good reputation, a reasonable amount of wealth and with friends, family and influence - and who take full advantage of his good fortune to do as much good as possible - are more fully a realization of what a human being naturally is than a virtous but isolated, poor, disfigured and dishonored person is. Not more happy - simply more fully a realization of what a human being naturally is. The Stoics would surely agree. They also see the things such as health, wealth, friends, family, influence as things a wise human being would naturally prefer to have.
"There is a great difference between joy and pain. If I am asked to choose, I will pursue one and avoid the other; for the one is in accordance with nature, the other contrary to it."
Delete- Seneca Letters 66.19
"Being wounded, or being roasted over a slow fire, or being afflicted with ill health is contrary to nature, but preserving an unflagging spirit amid such trials is in accordance with nature."
Delete- Seneca, Letters 66.38
Bottom line: In my opinion, Aristotle has been wildly misunderstood regarding this topic. First of all "external goods" such as some amount of health, wealth, goods looks, good reputation, and friends and family are only goods in so far as they are used wisely and in the service of virtue. In other words, they are only instrumental goods. Secondly they are only necessary for blessedness - not for happiness. A virtous person will be entirely happy without them but not "blessed" - not a fully realized human being but an essentially realized human being.
ReplyDeleteIn other words, what a Stoic can learn from Aristotle is that while external goods are neither good nor bad in themselves, they are not irrelevant for an understanding of what a fully realized human being is.
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